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THE TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE SUBJECT TO
MORTGAGE AND OTHER INCUMBRANCES
By

ROBERT

C. BROWN*

HE purpose of this paper is to examine the method of taxing
real estate which is affected by incumbrances-either physical
or legal. In particular, it is desired to consider the situation where
the incumbrance is a mortgage or otherwise purely for security.
And particular consideration is to be given to the propriety of
taxing as real estate the interest of a non-resident mortgagee or
similar incumbrancer in land within the jurisdiction.
VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE FOR TAX PURPOSES

The rule is well recognized that real estate is to be valued for
purposes of taxation at its actual and present market value.' Prospective value is not to be considered, except in so far as it would
be reflected in present value;2 nor is a higher value which might
3
conceivably be realized by selling the property on a time basis.
Even more clearly, a mere speculative value cannot properly be
considered. A rather amusing example of this last principle appears in a New York case." Here the question was the tax assessment of hillside land in the City of New York. The hill was so
steep as not to be suitable for building purposes, so that the land
had very little present value. The city tax authorities contended,
however, that it should be assessed ulon a theoretical valuation,
on the assumption that building sites should be blasted out of the
side of the hill, suggesting that the cliffs at the back of the houses
could be covered with morning glory vines so as to give the for*Professor of LIw, Indiana University.
2State v. Illinois Cent. R. R., (1861) 27 111. 64; Somes v. Meriden.
(1934)
119 Conn. 5, 174 At]. 184.
2
State v. Illinois Cent. R. R. (1861) 27 111. 64.
s1n re Taxes Bishop Estate. (1923) 27 Hawaii 190.
4
People v. Cantor. (1921) 197 App. Div. 437, 189 N. Y. S. 646. See
the same case, on resettlement, (1921) 198 App. Div. 317, 190 N. Y. S. 298.
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tunate inhabitants the advantages of living in a bower. The court,
unromantically but correctly, dismissed this suggestion as an "iridescent dream," and declined to permit any addition to the value of the
lots in their present condition.
The fact that the property cost more to acquire or build than
its present market value will not permit it to be taxed at more
than such market value,5 even though it appears that such excess
expenditures were justified from the business standpoint.8 It is
obvious that a property owner will often spend more for a home
or even a business building which will be suitable to his own purposes and tastes than the property can possibly be expected to sell
for. And a fortiori, property which has been inefficiently or extravagantly constructed cannot be taxed upon the basis of what
has been spent for it, but only for what it will bring.' No doubt
such extravagance should generally be discouraged, but the inevitable loss to the property owner will be sufficient for that purpose,
without saddling him with an eternal tax burden entirely out of
proportion to the value of the property. On the other hand, the
fact that the property is not now being used to its full capacity, or
as advantageously as is reasonably possible, will not reduce the
valuation : for it could readily be sold to a person who would be
able to make full use of it.
The general rules having thus been laid down, the next probleni relates to their application. Here considerable difficulties frequently arise. Ordinary commodities are constantly being bought
and sold, so that their market value is generally ascertainable with
considerable precision. Not so with respect to real estate, which is
always, to some degree at least, unique, and which is not transferred very frequently. The best test of market value-namely,
actual sales-is therefore generally not available. We must, accordingly, resort to other indications of such value, remembering

always that these are mere evidence and therefore not decisive.
For example, the earnings of the property may be considered."
Obviously this is not a decisive test,"0 but it is often helpful. In5State v. Weiher, (1922) 177 Wis. 445, 188 N. W. 598.
" Arlington Mills v. Salem, (1928) 83 N. H. 148, 140 Atl. 163. See also
State7 v. Petrick, (1920) 172 Wis. 82. 178 N. W. 251.
People v. Hamilton, (1928) 132 Misc. Rep. 506, 230 N. Y. S. 134; State
v. McNivan. (1931) 183 Minn. 539. 237 N. W. 410.
8Central Maine Power Co. v. Turner, (1930) 128 Me. 486, 148 Atd. 799.
9
State v. Illinois Cent. R. R., (1861) 27 Ill. 64; People v. Kalhfleish.
(1898) 25 App. Div. 432, 49 N. Y. S. 546, app. dismissed, (1898) 150
N. Y. 678. 50 N. E. 1121.
'"State v. Collector, (1853) 24 N. J. L. 108; State v. Randolph, (1856)
25 N. J. L. 427.
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deed, if the property is fully rented, and the rentals are on the
usual terms in the community, such rentals may constitute a sufficiently accurate measure of the market value."1
Similarly, cost of reproduction, while by no means decisive,
may nevertheless be valuable evidence of the market value.1 - Furthermore, other possible uses of the property than that in which
it is presently employed may also be pertinent in this connection. 3
In fact, any evidence which has a legitimate bearing upon the
market price of real estate is properly to be considered in seeking
to attain a fair estimate of its market value, which is the proper
criterion for tax purposes.14
In some special cases, there has been an intimation that the taxing value may deviate from the market value; but it is believed that
such suggestions cannot be followed. It has been held that the
valuation of submerged land is to be computed with reference to
the cost of :filling.15 This seems to be correct, since no one would
purchase the land (other than purely as a speculation), except at a
price which would enable him to incur the additional expense of
filling the land, and still have a total investment not in excess of the
then value of the land.
In another case,' 6 the New York courts had under consideration the proper assessment of the New York Stock Exchange
Building. The owner insisted that the building constituted an incumbrance upon the land, because it was unusable for any other
purpose whatever, and would, therefore, be unsalable except to a
person who was willing to assume the additional burden of tearing down or at least radically altering the building. The court
held, however, that the New York tax law required assessments
at the "full" value, and that this statute applied even though there
was no market value. It was decided that the cost of the building,
the cost of reproduction, and other similar data might be considered
in computing this "full" value.
It is submitted, however, that "full" value can mean nothing
more than market value. Probably the actual decision is correct,
for the building can hardly be considered as a real incumbrance
on the land. Certainly it could be altered for other purposes, and
"'Somes
v. 'Meriden, (1934) 119 Conn. 5. 174 Adl. 184.
123 People v. Kalbfleish, (1898) 25 App. Div. 432, 49 N. Y. S. 546.
1 Saco Water Power Co. v. Buxton, (1903) 98 Me. 295, 56 At. 914;
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Belmont, (1921) 283 Mass. 396, 131 N. E. 72.
14Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Belmont, (1919) 283 Mass, 190, 124

N. E. 21.

"5People v. Burke, (1928) 247 N. Y. 227. 160 N. E. 19.
"People v. Cantor, (1927) 221 App. Div. 193, 223 N. Y. S. 64.
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the value of the materials, etc., might much more than take care
of such additional cost. It would appear, then, that the building
itself, as well as the land, has a market value, though undoubtedly
such value would be difficult to estimate. The decision, therefore,
should not be regarded as an authority that anything other than
market value is the proper criterion for tax assessments. Certain
it is that real estate cannot be assessed higher because of some
special value which it may have to its present owner ;17 nor can it
be increased in assessed value merely because it is used by its
owner in connection with other property also owned by him.' 8
Coming a step closer to our fundamental problem of encumbered land is the situation where the land is subdivided horizontally, as, for example, by the sale of mineral rights. This is not the
same as a division of mere interests in land, as by dividing estates
or creating incumbrances. Land may be divided horizontally as
well as vertically, and when that is done, we have actually different
pieces of real estate, one above the other rather than side by side,
as is the more usual situation. When such a division exists, it is
not merely proper to tax the different pieces of real estate separately, but, in fact, the weight of authority is that the state must
do so. With reference to this matter, the supreme court of Louisiana has said:
"A sale of a landowner's mineral rights, either in whole or in
part, is therefore an alienation of a part of his interest in the land.
It is a di.snicinherinent of his ownership. .

.

. In that respect it is

more like a sale of an undivided interest in the land than like the
imposing of a mortgage or an ordinary lease upon the land. A
mortgage or an ordinary lease is not a transfer of any element of
ownership in the property mortgaged or leased. For that reason
mortgages and ordinary leases are not subjected to taxation by the
Revenue Law."'"
A so-called mineral "lease" is, according to the laws of most
states, actually a sale of the minerals in place, and the owners of
the minerals and of the royalty interests must be separately taxed
upon their respective properties. "0 Even non-mineral leases are
'7 Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Belmont, (1919) 233 Mass. 190, 124
N. E. 21.
',Davidson v. Board of Review, (1930)

209 Iowa 1332. 230 N. \V.

304.
1gShaw v. Watson, (1922) 151 La. 893, 92 So. 375. 378.
2OSanderson v. Scranton. (1884) 105 Pa. St. 469: Wolfe County v.
Beckett, (1907) 127 Ky. 252, 105 S. W. 447; Sheffield v. Hogg. (Tex. 1934)
77 S. W. (2nd) 1021.
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sometimes treated in.the same way;21 but here we seem to have
an incumbrance problem rather than one of physical division.
Even closer to our problem, though considering it from the
opposite viewpoint, is the situation of land to which valuable appurtenances-for example, an easement across other land-are
added. It would seem clear that such appurtenances add to the
market value-of such land, and therefore to its tax value.:- The
supreme court of New Hampshire has said with reference to this:
"Easements are taxable; if appurtenant, they are in general
taxed with and as a part of the land to which they belong. Easements in gross must necessarily be valued and taxed separately
from the land out of which they are granted.""
So, if water power is generated upon land, this addition to its
value may be included in tax assessments, even though the power
is actually used in another taxing subdivision of the state,2' or in
another state.25
The same idea has led to decisions - that franchises under
which business activities are conducted on the land in question
are to be included in the valuation of the land. This seems correct enough if, in fact, the land cannot be sold apart from the
franchise-as would ordinarily be the case with respect to railroads and perhaps other utilities.!t If, however, the land could
reasonably be sold to one who did not hold such a franchise or
who did not conduct such a business upon it, the franchise cannot
properly be considered a part of the land, and cannot, therefore,
be taxed as such.2 8 The obvious solution, to avoid the escape from
tax of the franchise, is to impose an excise tax with respect to it.
In fact, at the present time, nearly all such franchises are thus
taxed, and no attempt is made to tax them as part of the landan expedient which, however theoretically justifiable, is obviously
clumsy and usually unjust.
If valuable appurtenances add to the value of land, it would
2
Purcell v. Lexington, (1919) 186 Ky. 381. 216 S. W. 599; Henry
Grady Hotel Co. v. Atlanta, (1926) 162 Ga. 818. 135 S. E. 68.
22Jackson v. Smith, (1912) 153 App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y. S. 654, aff'd
(1914)3 213 N. Y. 630, 107 N. E. 1079.
2 Winnipiseogee Lake etc. Co. v. Gifford, (1887) 64 N. H. 337, 10 All.
849, 850.
2-4Whiting-Plover Paper Co. v. Linwood, (1929) 198 Wis. 590, 225
N. W.
177.
2
5Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Blackstone, (1912) 211 Mass. 14. 97 N. E. 58.
2
Stein v. Mobile (1850) 17 Ala. 234; Mobile v. Stein, (1875) 54 Ala.
23; 2Chicago, etc., Ry. v. State, (1906) 128 Wis. 553. 108 N. W. 557.
See Northern Pac. Ry. v. State, (1915) 84 Wash. 510. 147 Pac. 45.
28
State v. Petrick, (1920) 172 Wis. 82, 178 N. WV.251. See also.
Davidson v. Board of Review, (1930) 209 Iowa 1332, 230 N. V. 304.
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seem, by the same token, that unfavorable physical conditions
would reduce its valuation. For example, a structure on the land
which was actually an incumbrance upon it should reduce its
value. 23 It has been held, however, that where the owner of land
valuable for water power purposes floods it for the purpose of
developing power on other lands, the land first referred to is to be
taxed on the basis of its potential value for generating power.30
This doctrine seems at least partly unsound. It is true that such
property is, or may be, salable, but only at a reduction of the cost
of draining off the water and putting the land in such shape as to
develop its power. It seems clear that at least the market value
is greatly diminished by the present flooding of the land. The
courts seei to feel that a land owner should not be permitted to
reduce the value of his land to escape taxes, but it is hardly to be
supposed that a property owner will, at least under ordinary
circumstances, actually destroy his property merely for this purpose.
It seems fairly obvious, however, that the total valuation of the
various interests in a piece of land cannot be in excess of the value
of the land as a whole.3 The mathematical axiom that the whole
is equal to the sum of its parts is clearly applicable, and the value
of a piece of land certainly cannot be increased by dividing it up,
physically or otherwise.
It is true, as we have seen, that leaseholds, if actually of substantial value, may be separately assessed ;32 but such leaseholds
obviously constitute an incumbrance upon the landlord's interest in
the property, and reduce such reversionary value by the exact
amount of the value of the leasehold.13 However, a few cases have
been found actually, or apparently, inconsistent with the general
principle just stated; and such authorities must be briefly considered.
In Woodburn v. Skagit County,3 ' it appeared that after the
lands in question had been assessed for tax purposes, the assessor
learned that the owners had rented hunting privileges on the land
9

2

See People v. Cantor, (1927)

221 App. Div. 193, 233 N. Y. S. 64.
Slaterville Finishing Co. v. Greene, (1917) 40 R. I. 410, 101 At. 226;

30

Central
Maine Power Co. v. Turner, (1930) 128 Me. 486, 148 Atl. 799.
3
'Bowen v. Holt County, (1917) 101 Neb. 642, 164 S. W. 653; State v.
Jemez Land Co., (1924) 30 N. M. 24, 226 Pac. 890.
32See the cases cited in note 21.
33In re Taxes Bishop Estate. (1923)

27 Hawaii 190; People v. Barker,

(1907) 121 App. Div. 661, 106 N. Y. S. 336, aff'd (1910) 200 N. Y. 509,
93 N. E. 378.
34(1922) 120 Wash. 58, 206 Pac. 834.
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for $375 a year. He thereupon added to the previous assessed
valuation, which had been computed upon the basis of purely
agricultural use, an additional amount on account of the hunting
privileges. This action of the assessor was approved by the court.
It is believed this case is rightly decided, even though there is some
language indicating that the additional use of the land permitted
an assessment at more than its actual value. The truth would
seem to be that the land was under-assessed at the start, and that
the rental of hunting privileges merely evidenced this, rather than
permitting the assessment of the land at more than its actual value.
Land which in addition to its use for agricultural purpose, can be
rented for its hunting privileges is actually more valuable than
if its use were restricted to agriculture alone.
It has also been held by the supreme court of Michigan that
the "mortgage" on land may be assessed in addition to the value
of the land as unmortgaged. 3" This problem will be con-idered
more at length hereafter, but it seems clear that a mortgage on
land reduces the value to the mortgagor, though the amount of
such reduction may not be readily ascertainable. The tax on
the "mortgage," therefore, cannot be sustained as a tax on the
land, though it may well be sustained as a tax upon the debt
owed to the mortgagee. The same court later admitted this with
respect to a tax on a vendor's lien,3G which is economically equivalent to a purchase-money mortgage, though in this case treating
the tax as an excise rather than a property tax.
The most troublesome cases in this category are two decisions
by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, Lodgc v. S-wampscott,37 and Donovan v. Haverhill.3 8 In the former case, the plaintiff bought land which was subject to certain equitahle r--trictions, such restrictions diminishing the market value of the land.
It was held that the land could be assessed only at the market
value, subject to these restrictions. This seems obviously correct,
and is in accordance with the theory already stated that the various
interests in land, if assessed separately, cannot exceed the valuation
of the land as a whole. It is true that equitable restrictions are
rarely separately assessed because of the uncertainty of their value;
but where they are so asses-,ed, such asses.ed value must be deducted
from the value of other interests in the land.
33
3 Stumpf v. Storz, (1909) 156 Mich. 228, 120 N. W. 618.
6Nelson v. Breitenwischer. (1916) 194 Mich. 30, 160 N. W. 626.
37(1913)

216 Mass. 260, 103 N. E. 635.

38(1923) 247 Mass. 69, 141 N. E. 564.
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In Donovan v. Haverhill, however, the plaintiffs' land was reduced in value to them by subsisting leases, which they had given,
for rents now inadequate. It was held that the city was justified in
assessing the land at its full value without regard to the leases.
The court attempted to distinguish Lodge v. Swampscott, though
the attempt seems to have been neither very clear nor very successful. The Donovan Case has been adversely criticized,39 on the
ground that such a result is unfair to the land owner.
As will presently appear, there are some situations where the
taxing authorities are entitled to tax the land as a whole without
regard to incumbrances upon it. But this does not seem to be
such a case, as the landowner is in fact being taxed upon someone
else's property, exactly as if he sold the mineral rights upon land
and then were taxed upon the value of the land without regard
to such sale. 40 Possibly the two Massachusetts cases can be distinguished on the ground that in the Lodge Case the valuation was
not reduced by the voluntary act of the present owners of the land,
whereas in the Donovan Case it was. However, the court makes
nothing of this distinction, and, on analysis, it does not seem to
be sound, as the value of the land in both cases has been actually
diminished. Besides, in the Donovan Case the lessees were, or at
least ought to have been, subject to tax upon their own interests.
It is therefore impossible to resist the feeling that the latter case is
unsound.
THE DEDUCTION OF INCU-sMBRANCES ON LAND

It has been seen that if incumbrances on land are separately
assessed for taxation, their valuation must be deducted from the
value of the interest in the land subject to such incumbrances.
However, there may be some question as to the necessity for such
deduction at all. Some sorts of incumbrances certainly need not
be deducted and separately assessed if the taxing jurisdiction does
not desire to do so. 41 It would seem, however, that incumbrances
actually affecting the possession or use, and therefore necessarily
affecting the value of land, should be deducted. Thus, as already
seen, the value of leases on the land which diminish the value of
the lessor's interest should be deducted. 42 And a servient estate
3

9See (1924)
24 Col. L. R. 324.
10 See the cases cited in note 20.
4See 3 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., sec. 1161.
121n re Taxes Bishop Estate, (1923) 27 Hawaii 190.
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should be assessed at its value subject to easements, this value
being added to the assessment of the dominant estate. 3
Quite otherwise, however, is the situation with regard to incumbrances merely for security, of which mortgages are the typical example. Here, neither the possession nor the use of the
property is immediately affected, and the taxing jurisdiction is therefore under no obligation to deduct the value of the incumbranceswhich value is very difficult to ascertain anyway. It is certainly
not necessarily the amount of the debt secured, since the debt may
be, and frequently is, paid without resorting to the land.
The leading case on this point is Paddell v. New York," where
it was held that a mortgagor was not entitled to a deduction from
the assessed value of his property of the amount of the mortgage
debt. The court, speaking by Mr. Justice Holmes, buttressed its
reasoning not only upon the practical consideration already stated
-namely that the amount to be deducted is really unascertainable
-but also upon the important historical consideration that mortgaged land has from the earliest times generally been so assessed.
And the practical necessity, or at least convenience, of the taxing
power was given due weight in the following statement:
"And it may perhaps be doubted whether there is even a logical
objection to the sovereign power giv.ing notice to all persons who
may acquire property within its domain that when it conies to tax
it will not look beyond the tangible thing, and that those who buy
it must buy it subject to that risk.'""
The doctrine that no deduction need be made from the assessment of real property for taxation because of mortgages upon such
property has been reiterated in a number of cases." It has even
been held that the mortgagor is not entitled to the deduction when
he is no longer in possession, but no foreclosure has been effected. 47 Nor is it material that the mortgage indebtedness exceeds
the value of the land so that the equity of redemption is probably
of no value at all. 48 Of course this means that under this procedure the mortgagee has no taxable interest in the land. and if he is
"*Jackson v. Smith, (1912) 153 App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y.S. 54.
"(1908) 211 U. S. 446, 29 Sup. Ct. 139, 53 L. Ed. 275.
'5(1908) 211 U. S. 446, 450, 29 Sup. Ct. 139, 53 L. Ed. 275.
"Typical recent examples are: In re Inglis, (1918) 69 Okla. 64, 169
Pac. 1083; In re Rolater, (1918) 67 Okla. 215, 170 Pac. 307; Steinfeld
v. State, (1930) 37 Ariz. 389, 294 Pac. 834. See also Putnam v. Ford,
(1930) 155 Va. 625, 155 S.E. 823.
"7Flanagan v. Dunne, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1901) 105 Fed. 828. construing
the law of Florida.
"8Allen v. Harford County. (1891) 74 Md. 294. 22 Ati. 398; People v.
Jewell, (1894) 9 Misc. Rep. 647. 30 N. Y. S. 511.
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to be taxed, it must be on some other basis-generally a property
tax upon the indebtedness owed to him. 4 0

The doctrine has not

always been applied in inheritance tax cases,9 0 but here the situation is somewhat different, as the tax is to be measured not by the
value of the land, but by the value of the interest of the deceased
mortgagor-which obviously cannot exceed the value of the equity
of redemption.
Ordinarily, of course, the mortgagee has no obligation to pay
the taxes on the property, and it would seem that he generally has
no duty to refrain from purchasing it at a tax sale without
affecting the lien of his mortgage.5 1 He may also claim against the
mortgagor for taxes paid by him on the premises, 5 2 unless, indeed,

If,
a suit to foreclose is barred by the statute of limitations."
however, the mortgagee has foreclosed and bought in the premises, he is liable for all real property taxes thereafter assessed."
Nevertheless, a number of states do have a provision by which
the mortgagee's interest in real property is taxed separately. In
some jurisdictions the whole amount of the mortgage indebtedness
is deducted from the value of the property, and only the remainder
taxed to the mortgagor, the value up to the mortgage debt being
taxed to the mortgagee. 5 In others the amount of the deduction
from the mortgagor's interest is limited by the statute to a definite
maximum amount. In either case, there can be no serious quelion
as to the validity of such a provision, at least so far as resident
mortgagees are concerned.
While the state would not lose any revenue through this expedient, because the taxes which are saved to the mortgagor must
generally be paid by the mortgagee, yet the deduction has Iveen
allowed when the mortgage was to the state which, of course, is not
subject to tax."5 However, some statutes are so drawn as to pre49State v. Grey, (1862) 29 N. J. L. 380. See also Stumpf v. Strz.
(1909) 156 Mich. 228. 120 N. W. 618.
SOMcCurdy v. McCurdy, (1908) 197 Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881. But tf.
In re Hallenbeck, (1921) 231 N. Y. 409, 132 N. E. 131.
5'See 2 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., sec. 1538.
521n re May, (1907)
218 Pa. St. 64, 67 Atl. 120.
53Hill v. Townley, (1891) 45 Minn. 167, 47 N. W. 653.
54King v. Mt. Vernon Bldg. Ass'n, (1884) 106 Pa. St. 165.
5
5State v. Manning, (1878) 40 N. J. L. 461; Abbott v. Frost, (1904)
185 Mass. 398, 70 N. E. 478; Germania Trust Co. v. San Francisco, (1900)
128 Cal. 589, 61 Pac. 178; Grand Lodge, etc. v. Sarpy County, (1916) 99
Neb. 647, 157 N. W. 344.
-CPeople v. Board of Supervisors, (1888) 77 Cal. 136, 19 Pac. 257;
Smith v. Keagle, (1888) 78 Cal. 4. 20 Pac. 152. See also Grand Lodge.
etc. v. Sarpy County, (1916) 99 Neb. 647, 157 N. W. 344, holding that the
statute applies, so that the mortgage can be taxed on his interest in the land
even though the debt itself was non-taxable.
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lude this result, the provision being for the deduction of the
mortgage debt, or a part thereof, only when ihe mortgagee is subject to state taxation. 57 In some cases the provision for such deduction is not made applicable to railroad and other corporate
mortgages securing bond issues;"' but there may be some question as to- whether this classification complies with the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions. " '
At any rate, the deduction will not be required unless claim
therefor is made in accordance with the local statute. 0 It has further been held that even if the proper notice is given and the assessment is nevertheless made solely in the name of the mortgagor to
the extent of full value of the land, the assessment is not void,
but is merely erroneous as having been made in the wrong name. 1
However, such a statute provides for separate interests of the
mortgagor and the mortgagee for this purpose, so that a mortgagee who is compelled to pay all the taxes on the land can recover from the mortgagor only the amount paid upon the equity
of redemption.6 2 Furthermore, if the mortgage debt exceeds the
total value of the land, all of the taxes have to be paid by the mortgagee. 63 The general purpose of these statutes is to require the
mortgagee to assume part of the tax burden, and, in fact, some
effort has been made in several jurisdictions to preclude an arrangement between the parties to the mortgage by which the entire
tax burden is thrown upon the mortgagor. However, it has been,
in fact, rather difficult to enforce this requirement.,'
When it comes to the situation of a non-resident mortgagee,
the problem is more difficult. Indeed, for a long time it was
considered that any such scheme would be precluded by the famous
57
State v. Silvers, (1870) 41 N. J. L. 505; Steinfeld v. State, (1930)
37 Ariz. 389, 294 Pac. 834. See also State v. Rowe, (1922) 108 Neb. 232,
188 N. W. 107, upholding a change of the statute, bringing about this
result.8
5 Chicago, etc., Ry. v. State, (1906) 128 Wis. 553, 108 N. W. 557;
Trust Co. v. San Francisco, (1900) 128 Cal. 589, 61 Pac. 178.
Germania
59Russell v. Croy, (1901) 164 Mo. 69, 63 S.IV. 849. It would seem,
however, that there is sufficient difference between corporate mortgages
securing negotiable bonds and ordinary mortgages to justify this difference
in treatment. Chicago, etc., Ry. v. State, (1906) 128 Wis. 553. 108 N. \V. 557.
GOAbbott v. Frost, (1904) 185 Mass. 398, 70 N. E. 478. But cf. Sullivan v. Boston, (1908) 198 Mass. 119, 84 N. E. 443.
61
Polomares Land Co. v. Los Angeles County. (1905) 146 Cal 510
80 Pac. 931.
62
Savings & Loan Soc. v. Davidson, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 18991 38
C. C. A. 365, 97 Fed. 696, construing the law of California.
63
Bowen v. Holt County, (1917) 101 Neb. 642, 164 S.IV. 653.
64
See Russell v. Croy, (1901) 164 Mo. 69, 63 S.W. 849.
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Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bdnds.65 This case held
unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute imposing a tax upon interest paid by a domestic corporation upon bonds held by nonresidents, such bonds being secured by a mortgage upon real estate
in Pennsyvania. The court took the position that the bondholders had no property in Pennsylvania, saying as to this:
"The property mortgaged belonged entirely to the company, and
so far as it was situated in Pennsylvania was taxable there. If
taxation is the correlative of protection, the taxes which it there
paid were the correlative for the protection which it there received.
And neither the taxation of the property, nor its protection, was
augmented or diminished by the fact that the corporation was in
debt or free from debt. The property in no sense belonged to the
non-resident bondholder or to the mortgagee of the company. Tile
mortgage transferred no title; it created only a lien upon the property. Though in form a conveyance, it was both at law and in
equity a mere security for the debt.
"Such being the character of a mortgage in Pennsylvania, it
cannot be said, as was justly observed by counsel, that the nonresident holder and owner of a bond secured by a mortgage in
that state owns any real estate there. A mortgage being there a
mere chose in action, it only confers upon the holder, or the party
for whose benefit the mortgage is given, a right to proceed against
the property mortgaged, upon a given contingency, to enforce, by
its sale, the payment of his demand. This right has no locality independent of the party in whom it resides. It may undoubtedly
be taxed by the state when held by a resident therein, but when
held by a non-resident it is as much beyond the jurisdiction of the
state as the person of the owner. ' ' 61
The court also argued that such a tax impaired the obligation of
the contract between the corporation and the bondholders.
The reasoning of the court, in so far as it is based upon the
contracts clause of the constitution, is demonstrably false and has
been clearly repudiated. It is entirely clear that the state had
never agreed not to tax this interest. Furthermore, the argument
quoted above, that the bondholders had no property in Pennsylvania, because a mortgage does not constitute an interest in real
estate, is likewise entirely unsound. This will be dealt with more
fully hereafter. The true justification of the decision is that the
tax which Pennsylvania sought to impose was actually upon the
debt, and the debt is to be regarded as situated, for tax purposes,
at the domicile not of the debtor but of the creditor.0 7 Therefore,
Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction to impose this tax.
65(1872) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 300, 21 L. Ed. 179.
6615 Wall. (U.S.) 300, 322-23, 21 L. Ed. 179.
67
c See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What Is Left of It,

(1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 407.
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These fallacies of the Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held
Bonds were successfully demonstrated in 1892 by the Michigan
supreme court in Common Council v. Board of Assessors.8 This
case upheld a statute requiring the mortgagor's and the mortgagee's
interests in land to be separately assessed, though the mortgagor
was to be held liable for the entire tax if it was not collected from
the mortgagee. The court stated that there was no injustice to tile
mortgagor in this, since, except for the special statute, the mortgagor would have to pay the entire tax anyway.' The reasoning of
the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds Case, to the effect that a
mortgage is not an interest in land, is effectively rebutted in the
following statement from the prevailing opinion:
"But, while it is true that the mortgage is a mere security for
the debt, yet it conveys a qualified property in the land. While it
is not an estate which entitles the mortgagee to possession before
foreclosure, it is nevertheless an estate or interest in lands which
is protected by our registration laws as fully as any other title or
interest." 9
The same doctrine, that a non-resident mortgagee may be taxed
on his interests in land situated within the taxing jurisdiction,
was finally approved by the federal Supreme Court in the leading
case of Savings and Loan Society v. Afultnozmah County." Here
an Oregon statute,-' providing for such taxation, was held to be
valid with respect to a California corporation holding a mortgage
on Oregon land. The reasoning of the Case of the State Tax on
Foreign-Held Bonds 2 was repudiated by the court, so far as that
case had taken the position that a mortgagee has no interest in the
land. Pertinent excerpts from the opinion follow:
"If the law treats the mortgagee's interest in the land as real
estate for his protection, it is not easy to see why the law should
forbid it to be treated as real estate for the purpose of taxation."--"Although the right which the mortgage transfers in the land
covered thereby is not the legal title, but only an equitable interest
and by way of security for the debt, it appears to us to be clear
upon principle, and in accordance with the weight of authority,
that this interest, like any other interest legal or equitable, may be
taxed to its owner (whether resident or non-resident) in the state
where the land is situated, without contravening
any provision of
74
the constitution of the United States.1
68(1892) 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787.
G9(1892) 91 Mich. 78. 51 N. \V. 787. 792.
70(1898) 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.
7
'Upheld by the State court in Mumford v. Sewall, (1883)
67, 4 Pac. 585.
;2(1872) 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. Ed. 179.
-3(1898) 169 U. S. 421, 429, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.
74169 U. S. 421, 431-32, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.

11 Or.
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It is to be noted, however, that only the reasoning of the Case oj
the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds was repudiated; the actual
decision of that case, that only the domicile of the creditor can
impose a property tax upon debts, still stands and has, in fact. in
the last few years, been very strongly reinforced. 5
It is obvious that such a tax upon a non-resident mortgagor's
interest cannot be imposed without an explicit statute to that effect.
In fact, comparatively few jurisdictions now attempt to do it. But
if Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County7, is still to be
recognized as in good standing, any state may, at its discretion,
impose such a tax. This problem must therefore be considered.
THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE TAXATION

As has already been pointed out, the problem of multiple taxation is often presented in inheritance tax cases as well as in property tax cases;77 yet this particular problem is rarely presented in
such cases. If the mortgagor (lies, the inheritance tax may undoubtedly be measured by the entire value of the land. without
respect to the mortgage;"' though of course only land within the
taxing jurisdiction can be used as a measure of any inheritance
tax. Generally, however, an allowance is made for the indebtedness, even though the mortgagor was a non-resident.7 9 If the
mortgagee dies, only one or two states have even apparently asserted the right to impose an inheritance tax with respect to the
transfer of his interest, if he was a non-resident." But this obviously raises the same fundamental problem, more frequently
presented in the property tax cases here considered.
The first step toward the solution of this problem is to ascertain
7

See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It,
(1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 407. The opinion of the Maryland court in Allen
v. National Batik, (1901) 92 Md. 509, 48 Atl. 78. that the Savings & Loan
Soc. Case wholly overrules the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds Case,
is shown to be false by the opinion in the former case itself. See also
Musgrove v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1909) 111 Md. 629. 75 Atli. 245.
-6(1898) 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.
77
See Baldwin v. Missouri, (1930) 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74
L. Ed. 1056.
IsSee In re Hallenheck, (1921) 231 N. Y. 409, 132 N. E. 131.
7
"McCurdy v. McCurdy. (1908) 197 Mass, 248, 83 N. E. 881.
8sIn In re Stanton, (1905)
142 Mich. 491, 105 N. XV. 1122, such a
claim was made, but the tax was apparently really measured by the notes
held by the non-resident: and such a tax is clearly not now permitted. Of
course, notes or other evidences of indebtedness held by a resident decedent
may be included in the measure of inheritance tax upon his estate, even though
such indebtedness is secured by mortgage on land outside the state. State
v. Probate Court, (1920) 144 Minn. 155, 176 N. NV. 493.
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the nature of the mortgagee's interest. If it is an interest in land,
it would seem that such interest can properly be taxed by the
jurisdiction where the land is, even though the mortgagee is a
non-resident.
It is submitted that the mortgagee's interest is an interest in
land, and this irrespectve of the particular theory of mortgages
which the state purports to follow. The federal Supreme Court
has said:
"A brief definition of a mortgage under modern law is not
easy to make. At common law a mortgage was a conditional conveyance to secure the payment of money or the performance of
some act, to be void upon such payment or performance. By more
modem law and under the statutes of many states a mortgage is
a mere lien upon land. Its dominant attribute is security, but
nevertheless it must be regarded as 'both a lien in equity and a
conveyance at law.' Pomeroy, § 1191. The interest of a mortgagee in the land is therefore conveyed to him by the mortgagor,
and even if under the laws of Montana a mortgage is primarily
security for a debt and creates a lien only, it is a lien which may
become the title. The decree of the court conveying the title is, of
course, the act of the law, but it is the act of the law consummating
the act of the mortgagor. And the sale and deed relate to the date
of the mortgage, conveying the title which was then possessed by
the mortgagor.""'
The same doctrine is followed explicitly even in states like New
York, which have gone farthest in enunciating the so-called "lien"
theory of mortgages. 8 2- There may be some question as to the
exact nature and effect of the mortgagee's interest, 3 but there
cannot be any doubt that he has some interest in the land. If he
has not, it is impossible to see howlhe can obtain complete title
through a court action without the cooperation of the mortgagor ;"
"'United States v. Commonwealth etc. Trust Co.. (1904) 193 U. S.
651, 655-56, 24 Sup. Ct. 546, 48 L. Ed. 830. It will be noted that this
reasoning also repudiates that which has been quoted from Case of the
State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds. (1872) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 300, 21 L. Ed.
179. The Court has recently invalidated the Frazier-Lemke Act in Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, (1935) 295 U. S. 555, 55 Sup.
Ct. 855, 79 L. Ed. 1593, on the ground that the act deprives the
mortgagee of his property without due process of law. Thus, it is ch.ar
that the court still regards the mortgagee as having a property interest in
the mortgaged
land.
82
Hubbell v. Mfoulson, (1873) 53 N. Y. 225: Simpson v. Del Hoyo.
(1883) 94 N. Y. 189. In both of these cases the court explicitly admits
that a mortgage is a conveyance to the mortgagee of anl interest in the land;
furthermore, the results in both cases cannot be rationalized on any other
theory.
8
3See Gavit, Under the Lien Theory of Mortgages is the Mortgage
Only8 a Power of Sale?. (1931) 15 Mi
~sor.\
L.Aw RImxImw 147.
4See Durfee, The Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage-Some
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for one who has no interest in property whatever cannot obtain
title to it without a voluntary conveyance by the owner.65 It is
clear, therefore, that the mortgage itself is a conveyance of an
interest-limited and undefinable, but nevertheless clearly existing
-from the mortgagor to the mortgagee."' Upon this interest, it
would seem that the mortgagee could constitutionally be taxed.
But is this multiple taxation? No doubt this is an immaterial
question when both parties to the mortgage are residents of the
taxing state. It is clear that the debt may be taxed to the
mortgagee, and the land also be taxed at its full value, either to
the mortgagor alone or divided between the mortgagor and mortgagee. From a legal standpoint, at least, there are two pieces of
property, namely the debt and the land. Yet the unfairness of
this is so evident, at least when it is carried to its logical extreme.
that many states have reduced the burden by taxing the creditor
only on his "net credits;" permitting the deduction of his indebtedness.8 ' This is permitted even when the state constitution forbids
exemptions not therein specified, the courts holding that this is
no exemption, but merely a deduction preventing taxation upon
purely fictional property."" The deduction of indebtedness is permitted, even though it is secured by property in another state.8 All
this is not directly in point, especially as such a deduction is permitted only by express statutory provision, 0 but it does indicate
that there is danger in assuming the absence of multiple taxation
merely because more than one piece of property, in the legal
sense, can be found.
Generalizations, (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 587; and Durfee, The Lien Theory
of the Mortgage-Two Crucial Problems, (1913) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 495.
85
Obviously a foreclosure is not such a voluntary conveyance. Abbott
v. Frost, (1904) 185 Mass. 398, 70 N. E. 478; Steinfeld v. State, (1930)
37 Ariz. 389, 294 Pac. 834.
86
Occasional dicta to the contrary can still be found, as, for example,
in Adams v. Colonial, etc., Mortgage Co., (1903) 82 Miss. 263, 34 So. 482,
and Chicago, etc., Ry. v. State, (1906) 128 Wis. 553, 108 N. W. 557. Cf.,
also, the quotation referred to in note 19. It is believed, however, that
practically all modern cases reach a result which is inconsistent with any
other theory than that the mortgagee has a real, though limited, interest in
the land.
87See, for example, State v. Pearson, (1853) 24 N. J. L. 254; Lancaster
County v. McDonald, (1905) 73 Neb. 453, 103 N. W. 78.
"SFlorer v. Sheridan, (1893) 137 Ind. 28, 36 N. E. 365. The mortgage
exemption granted in Indiana to the mortgagor is justified by the same

reasoning.

State v. Smith, (1902)

""State v. Pearson, (1853)
90

Appeal of Baylies, (1905)

158 Ind. 543, 63 N. 1-. 25.

24 N. J. L. 254.

127 Iowa 124, 102 N. W. 813; People v.

Ledford, (1926) 321 II. 247, 151 N. E. 867.
Court, (1920) 144 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493.

See also State v. Probate
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Nevertheless, in view of what has been said, it may well be
contended that there is actually no multiple taxation under the
doctrine of Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County."L
The mortgagee, as has been demonstrated, has property within the
state wherein the land is situated. Because he has interest in that
very land, there seems to be no reason why he should not pay a
tax on that interest, if the state desires to exact such a tax, just as
any other non-resident is taxed upon land owned by him in the
state. 2 If he were a resident, he could also be taxed upon the
debt.' Since he is a non-resident, this cannot be done; but there
seems to be no reason that he should be exempt from tax upon
what is within the state's taxing jurisdiction-namely, his interest
in real estate within the state. Some courts have conceded that this
may result in multiple taxation from an economic standpoint;"
but such a concession does not apparently affect the validity of
the tax upon the non-resident's property in the state.
Yet the concession is itself dangerous, and may prove to be
fatal. It cannot be denied that the doctrine of the Savings and
Loan Society Case inevitably involves multiple taxation in an
economic sense. A quotation from the argument of counsel in the
Mississippi case of Adams v. Colonial, etc., Mortgage Co.,"3 criticising the Savings and Loan Society Case, seems unanswerable
from that point of view. This reads as follows:
"The sophistry of this reasoning is very apparent, when we
reflect that, on the concession here made by the court, the state
where the creditor resides may be taxed [sic] upon the debt secured
by the mortgage, and thus he would be liable to double taxation
for the same item of property . . . once in his own state on the
debt, and once in Oregon on the instrument which evidences and
secures it. -If further refutation is needed, it is sufficient to point
out that a security divorced from the debt which it secures is a
phantom, and can have no taxable value."19 6
There are court decisions explicitly avowing this result, and yet
91(1898) 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.
9-Common Council v. Board of Assessors, (1892) 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W.
787. There is no legal objection to such double taxation, at least within the
state, there being two pieces of property. 1 Cooley, Taxation, pp. 238 if;
Wickersham, Double Taxation, (1926) 12 Va. L. Rev. 185.
93 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, (1879) 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. Ed. 558; State v
Grey, (1862) 29 N. J. L. 380.
9In re Stanton, (1905) 142 Mich. 491, 105 N. W. 1122; State v.
Probate Court, (1920)

144 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493.

95(1903) 82 Miss. 263, 34 So. 482.
98(1903) 82 Mfiss. 263, 34 So. 482, 516.
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defending it on the theory that such economic multiple taxation is
97
unobjectionable.
Furthermore, no matter how liberal the federal Supreme Court
may have been in the past, there is little question that it is now
tending to invalidate all multiple taxation where more than one
state is concerned. 8 For all practical purposes, this has been accomplished with respect to tangible property; and the decisions of
the past four or five years9 9 have shown a strong tendency to
restrict the taxation of intangible property also to one jurisdiction
-namely, that of the owner. Where intangible property consists
of a debt, this means that it is taxable only at the residence of
the creditor. Accordingly, if the doctrine of Savings and Loan
Society v. Multnomah County is to be regarded as sanctioning a
tax upon the indebtedness by a state other than that of the domicile
of the mortgagee, that case will probably no longer be followed.
With a single exception, the recent cases in the federal Supreme
Court, which have definitely shown its hostility to multiple taxation
of this sort, 10 apparently have not considered this particular problem. The one case which did mention it was Baldwuin v. Missouri.101 Mr. Justice McReynolds, at the close of his opinion for
the majority in that case, said, apparently rather casually:
"This cause does not involve the right of a state to tax either
the interest which a mortgagee as such1 0 2may have in lands lying
therein, or the transfer of that interest.
It should be noted also that the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone cited the Savings and Loan Socicty Case and stated
that it should not be deemed to be overruled.103 It must be confessed, however, that since this is in a dissenting opinion, it might
well be regarded as some authority that the case so mentioned has,
in fact, been discredited.
Prophecy as to the final result in this controversy is necessarily
9T
Allen v. National Bank, (1901) 92 Md. 509, 48 Atl. 78; Musgrove
etc., R. Co., (1909) 111 Md. 629, 75 Atl. 245.
v. Baltimore,
98
See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It,
(1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 407. But cf. Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax, (1935)
44 Yale L. J. 582.
99
Especially, Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S.
204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371; Baldwin v. Missouri, (1930) 281 U. S.
586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (1930) 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54, 75 L. Ed. 131; and First
National Bank v. Maine, (1932) 284 U. S.312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed.
313. 0
1 Cited in note 99.
101(1930) 281 U. S.586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436. 74 L. Ed. 1056.
102281 U. S. 586, 594, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056.
108281 U. S.586, 597, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056.
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hazardous. In the writer's opinion, however, the court is likely
to adhere to the doctrine of the Savings and Loanz Society Case
and to continue to hold that a state may constitutionally tax the interest of a non-resident mortgagee as real estate. It is impossible to deny that such a result does involve the possibility of a
multiple economic burden-a tax upon the debt at the domicile of
the creditor-mortgagee, and a tax upon the mortgagee at the place
where the mortgaged land is situated. And it is likewise impossible
to deny that the recent cases which have been referred to' give
sufficient argumentative basis for invalidating such taxation on this
very ground.
But the better reasoning seems to be the other way. Granted
that the creditor is holding the mortgage merely as security, 0 5 yet
this security constitutes an interest in land within the taxing
jurisdiction. If the land tax is to be deemed an additional burden upon the debt, yet it seems economically fair that the creditor
should pay this, because of his enjoyment of the additional security.
At least it should be within the authority of the state in its discretion to impose such a tax. It is submitted, therefore, that the
doctrine of Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomnmh Comnity'" is,
at least arguably, economically desirable as well as technically
sound. The tendency of the federal Supreme Court to invalidate
multiple taxation seems on the whole desirable, but it should not
be carried so far as to prevent the taxing of an actual interest in
real estate merely because that interest happens to be held solely for
security.
CONCLUSION.

It has been seen that real estate is to be taxed at its market
value-a rule which is really without any exceptions. Where a
particular piece of property is held by several persons, either because of physical divisions or by reason of their holding undivided
interests, 0 each person is to be taxed according to his own interest. The total of these interests should equal, but not exceed, the
value of the property considered as a whole.
If the property is subject to present incumbrances reducing its
value to the owner, such valuation should be correspondingly re"o"See note 99.

the quotation referred to in note 96.
100(1898)
169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.
"' 7 There is an exception, of course, where real property is held by a
205Cf.

life tenant or other holder of a limited freehold estate. In such a case. the
entire property is assessed to the present holder, and no taxes are collected
from the remainderman. 3 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., sec. 1107.
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duced and the incumbrances taxed to their owners-normally, of
course, the owners of adjoining land to which such incumbrances
are appurtenant. It is well settled, however, that this rule does
not apply to incumbrances merely for the purpose of security-of
which a mortgage is the typical example. In most jurisdictions,
the practice is to tax such land without regard to the incumbrances,
and it is entirely settled that such a practice is legally justifiable.
On the other hand, it has been regarded as equally well settled
that a taxing jurisdiction may, if it chooses, tax the mortgagee's
interest in the land, at a value not exceeding the mortgage debt,
separately from the mortgagor's interest, which in that event
must be proportionately reduced in value. Such is clearly the doctrine where both parties to the mortgage are subject to the taxing
jurisdiction of the state; and there are authoritative decisions to
the same effect' 018 even though the mortgagee is a non-resident.
This last doctrine may conceivably contravene a strong, though
comparatively recent, line of decisions by the federal Supreme
Court to the effect that taxation by more than one state of debts
and other intangible property violates the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution, and that the only jurisdiction entitled
to tax debts as property is the domicile of the creditor. It may be
urged that a tax upon the interest of the non-resident mortgagee
is an economic burden upon the debt and therefore would violate
this rule, the debt being clearly taxable at the domicile of the
creditor-mortgagee. The technical answer to this argument is
that the mortgagee owns an interest in real estate in the taxing
state where the land is situated, and should be subject to tax
thereon. The more realistic argument seems to be that the mortgagee has an actual benefit through the holding of the security in
the taxing state, and there is therefore no very clear economic injustice in subjecting him to this tax. In the opinion of the writer,
therefore, the court can, and should, adhere to this doctrine. In
that event, a state may, if it chooses, divide the interest of mortgagor and mortgagee in the same real estate, and tax each in proportion to his own interest. By this means, a mortgagee of land
within the state may be taxed upon his interest (which cannot exceed the amount of the mortgage debt) even though he is a nonresident of that state and is, therefore, not subject to taxation
upon the debt itself. Where it is not done, the mortgagor will,
of course, be taxable upon the entire value of the land.
'OsEspecially, Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, (1898)
169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. Ed. 803.

